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Does Indonesia’s macroeconomic work well towards the political year?1 
Kiki Verico2 
 
Abstract 
This paper utilizes the timeframe of 2014-2018 as the period with some of the global underperformed 
macroeconomic indicators. This paper found that in late 2016, Indonesia’s macroeconomic indicators 
started shown some improvements that keep real and monetary sector’s equilibrium to be stable. This 
paper observes the external balance of current account, exchange rate stability, inflation and interest 
rate as well as consumption patterns, saving-investment gap, fiscal discipline & fiscal sustainability. It 
analyses the government expenditure multiplier, real & monetary sector stability and institutional 
coordination between fiscal authority, monetary authority, and financial service authority. Real sector 
improvements which have been rolling since 2017 has significantly contributed to the recent 
Indonesia’s macroeconomic stability. Technically, if all on the track, this will sustain during the 
upcoming political year of 2019.  
 
Keywords: Current Account, Exchange Rate, Economic Growth, Inflation, Interest Rate, Saving-
Investment Gap, Real Sector Competitiveness, Fiscal Balance & Monetary Policy   
  
                                                          
1 This paper has been published as the Working Paper of the LPEM FEB UI at http://www.lpem.org/does-
indonesia’s-macroeconomic-work-well-towards-the-political-year/  
2 The author is a Senior Researcher of the LPEM FEB UI, Lecturer of the FEB UI and holds a Ph.D. degree in 
International Studies (Economics) from the Waseda University. The views in this paper do not represent the 
author’s institution view. All mistakes and errors are author’s responsibility. Email address: kiki.verico@ui.ac.id  
and kiverico@gmail.com.  
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1. Indonesia’s Macroeconomic Posture 
Recent global macroeconomy faces big challenges as the growing anti-globalization sentiment after 
the global financial crises (GFC) and oil price decay that reduced the price of gas and primary 
commodity. Data of ‘before the GFC and after the GFC’ shown that the global economic growth has 
been slowing down from 3.4% to 2.8%. These unfortunate global factors have declined global demand 
and impacted Indonesia’s macroeconomy. Indonesia also faces domestic challenges in the lack of 
infrastructure development of outside of Java, low coverage of health and education public services, 
challenged in good governance, clean government and structural reform. How does the government 
of Republic of Indonesia manage these global and domestic challenges?        
  
This paper discusses it from the macroeconomic perspective. It starts with a variable that connects 
domestic and global factors: The Current Account Balance3. Data shows that Indonesia’s current 
account balance was a deficit, for the first time since reform era4, in the last quarter of 2011. The total 
current account in 2011 was still surplus at USD 1.68 billion, but the deficit trend remained. In 2012, 
Indonesia’s total current account became negative at USD 24.4 billion (-2.65% per GDP) then worst 
off in 2013 at USD 29.1 billion (-3.19%)5.  
 
Deficit current account makes local currency (Rupiah/USD) to depreciate from Rupiah/USD 8,770 
(average in period of 2011) to Rupiah/USD 9,386 (2012). It then touched the bottom at Rupiah/USD 
13,389 (2015) before slightly appreciated to Rupiah/USD 13,308 (2016) and 13,380 (2017). This 
depreciation generated undervalue Rupiah to USD6. The Real Effective Exchange Rate has dropped 
from 99.98 in 2011 to 87.05 in 2014. The pattern of nominal exchange rate reflects the pattern of the 
real exchange rate. Table 1 (appendix) shows that undervalue of Rupiah/USD in 2017 is almost equal 
to that in 2013. As currency stability reflects country’s open macroeconomic balance then it can be 
inferred that Indonesia’s open macroeconomy has been getting better starting since 2016.  
Indonesia’s current account deficit has persistently decreased from USD 25.4 billion (-3.09% per GDP) 
in 2014 to USD 16.3 billion in 2016 (-1.8% per GDP).  
 
Indonesia’s current account is a deficit because of the gap in primary income, on the average, above 
USD 20 billion per year since 2010. Indonesia is a net borrowing country of which foreign acquisition 
of its asset is higher than her incurrence of liabilities in abroad. Indonesia’s net primary income is 
always deficit due to the foreigner’s investment income in Indonesia from the portfolio, and direct 
investment is still higher than the opposite. Compensation of employees is also always detrimental 
from USD 781 million (2010) to double of USD 1,553 million (2016). Compensating this primary deficit, 
besides surplus in secondary income, Indonesia relies on the net export of goods. Her net export of 
                                                          
3 Yit = Cit+Iit+Git+(Xit-Mit); (Yit-Tit-Cit)-Iit+(Tit-Git) =Xit-Mit; (Sit-Iit) +(Tit-Git) = (Xit-Mit); Macroeconomy consists of three 
balances: Saving – Investment, Fiscal and Net Export. NXit=Xit-Mit = CAit-PIit-SIit; (Sit-Iit) +(Tit-Git) = CAit-PIit-SIit; 
Investment and Government Expenditure which higher than Saving and Tax inquire global support which 
represents in PI and SI. Symbol of variables: Y = GDP; C = Consumption; I = Investment; G = Government 
Expenditure; X = Export; M=Import; T = Tax; CA = Current Account; PI = Primary Income; SI = Secondary Income. 
This paper starts the analysis from CA as this reflects the whole macroeconomic performance of real sector (IS 
curve) and money demand of monetary sector (LM curve). CA is mirroring both the saving-investment gap and 
fiscal balance. Theoretically, CA patterns reflect that of the exchange rate. The latter is the ultimate indicator of 
real and monetary sector resiliencies.       
4 Indonesia’s average economic growth during New Order is higher than that in Reform Era, but it never 
experienced positive current account. 
5 Increasing deficit in CA was caused by the ‘Taper Tantrum’ of declining ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE) in the US 
market. It indicated that US economy was getting better than capital flown back to the US market. It hurts 
financial market of the so-called ‘fragile five’ countries of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa & Turkey. 
Indonesia and India were the fastest countries that successfully managed its negative impact (Basri, M.C., 2017). 
Details at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2017.1392922    
6 REER in 2010 = 100  
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service is also always negative. The international price decline in oil and gas that naturally followed by 
the falling price in global commodity price has decreased Indonesia’s export value. Net export of goods 
is still positive but start to drop from USD 33.8 billion in 2011 to USD 8.68 billion in 2012. This drop 
continued in 2013 and 2014. However, it increased double to USD 14.05 billion in 2015, USD 15.39 
billion in 2016 and recently USD 15.77 billion up to third quarter of 2017.  
 
The Figure 1 (appendix) shows the factors that decrease the current account deficit is the net surplus 
in the export of non-oil & gas, the declining deficit of oil & gas trade and the weakening of service 
trade deficit. In 2016, mining price of iron ore, nickel, tin, and copper was starting to increase following 
the growth in China’s commodity-based industry, infrastructure, and construction. These have 
contributed the positive impact on Indonesia’s export, current account, and economic growth. In 
2017, Indonesia’s economic growth is better than that of 2016. Macroeconomic performance has 
touched the bottom and again, started to increase in his second-year period7.   
 
Indonesia economy is starting to be more productive. Adopting the interrelation between MRAS 
(Medium Run Aggregate Supply) and the AD (Aggregate Demand) shock, it can be inferred that if the 
AD is shifting to the upward right when the MRAS is elastic, then the increase of quantity (growth) will 
be higher than inflation rate 8. Data from 1970 to 2017 confirmed that since 2015, Indonesia’s 
economic growth is always higher than the inflation rate. In the Asian Financial Crises (AFC) of 1997-
1998, Indonesia experienced negative economic growth of -13%, high-rise inflation of 75% and 
decreased of GNI per Capita in USD due to the depreciation of Rupiah per USD.  
 
The pattern of this drop reflects J-curve of which Indonesia took five years from 1998 to 2003 to adjust 
to the AFC impact. Why? The depreciation of Rupiah does not directly benefit the exporters as some 
exporters are also the importer; therefore, it increases import price9.  
 
On average, Indonesia economic growth before crises is 6.7% with the inflation rate of 13%. After the 
adjusted period of crises, 2004 – 2014, Indonesia’s average economic growth was 5.7% with the 
inflation rate of 10%. Before President Joko Widodo’s period, the inflation rate was always higher than 
the economic growth. Now the average of economic growth of 5% is still higher than the inflation rate 
of 4%, the lowest rate ever in Indonesia. The Figure 2 (appendix) proves that Indonesia’s productivity 
is moving towards her ‘golden rule’ of economic growth (Solow Model). 
 
Theoretically, economic growth generates inflation rate and the opposite10. There is a trade-off 
between high inflation & declining unemployment. On the other hand, low inflation rate is good for 
consumer’s purchasing power, debtor repayment ability and investor expectation. Therefore, 
economic growth needs low inflation and interest rate (Fischer’s Effect). Interest rate is an ‘effect’, 
not a cause’ (Mises, 1912)11. Both Fischer & Mises proved that inflation rate is vital for interest rate 
and growth. Ideally, Indonesia has the inflation rate that lower than her economic growth.  
  
                                                          
7 Current Account reflects economic growth capacity (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, IMF, 2007) 
8 Verico, K. (2011). Achieving Indonesia’s Golden Moment of Economic Growth, The Jakarta Post, 3 August 2011 
9 The recent Indonesia’s upper-middle industry data (2015) shows that 35% of Indonesia exporters are 
importers.     
10 Log Yit1 =  Log Yit0 + β. (Log Pit1 − Log Pit0) of which Y is GDP in constant price, P is CPI, i is space, t is time. 
This formula shows that economic growth needs inflation rate. In constructing positive slope of supply-curve, it 
is proven that inflation decreases real wage then increases demand for labour and finally increases economic 
growth.    
11 Mises, L.V. (1912), The Theory of Money & Credit, CreateSpace, US 
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2. Indonesia’s Macroeconomic Gap  
2.1. Saving-Investment Gap 
In the beginning, the government was a very optimist with seven percent of Indonesia’s economic 
growth. It made National Government Budget (APBN) overestimated. Minister of Finance12 adjusted 
APBN according to Indonesia’s real economic growth of five percent. Recent Indonesia’s economic 
growth was below the ‘optimum’ forecasting of six percent13.  
 
The question is why Indonesia’s recent economic growth was slightly lower than the previous period? 
The quick answer is because of its current account deficit. Data shows the lower the deficit, the higher 
the economic growth. This paper attempts to further respond to this question with other variables.         
 
It starts with consumption growth. In mid of 2017, government puzzled on why Indonesia’s 
consumption as the largest contribution to GDP (around 57%) has been growing below the 
expectation. In 2016 it was reflected in the increasing rate of saving per GDP from 30.5% (2013) to 
32.15% (2016). In 2017, it was because of the ‘shifting pattern of consumption’ from non-leisure (high 
proportion to consumption) to leisure (low proportion to consumption)14. The highest proportion in 
Indonesia’s consumption is food & beverage other than restaurant (39%), transportation & 
communication (23%), equipment (13%) and hotel & restaurant (10%). This shifting has slowed down 
the consumption growth. This paper uses economic growth of 5.06% as the threshold. The data shows 
that consumption growth for food & beverage other than restaurant was above it at 5.24% while 
equipment and apparel, footwear & maintenance service growth was below it at 4.12% and 3.47% 
respectively. On the opposite, the growth of leisure consumption of restaurant & hotel and 
transportation & communication was impressively increased at 5.87% and 5.32% respectively. The 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 (appendix) show the details.   
 
The leisure-time destination to abroad has increased due to the low-cost of air transport. Immigration 
Directorate General data showed that during long public holidays of June 18th to July 3rd, number of 
Indonesian tourists went abroad increasing from 441,340 (2016) to 492,523 (2017). Another 
interesting fact was an increased consumption growth of health & education that indicated two things, 
first, the increasing human capital investment and second, the rising basic public services. Both are 
important but supporting long-run economic growth instead of short-run. Indonesia is also facing 
more complicated consumption patterns due to the changing transaction from off-line to online. It 
will affect the recorded value of GDP since the more virtual the economy, the higher informal activities 
and the more underestimate the GDP15.  
 
How about investment growth? In developing countries, investment inquiry is higher than saving rate. 
There is a need for foreign investment inflows. In the last six years, Indonesia received FDI inflows on 
average at around USD 25 billion. FDI inflows have significantly increased. Indonesia has received on 
average of USD 23 billion in 2012-2014 while in 2014-2017 increased up to USD 27 billion. The highest 
                                                          
12 H.E. President Joko Widodo reshuffled his related economic ministers three times within two years on August 
12th,2015, July 27th,2016 and October 14th,2016. On July 27th,2016, H.E. Sri Mulyani Indrawati replaced H.E. 
Bambang Brodjonegoro as the Minister of Finance.  
13 In 2007, Indonesia would like to achieve High Income Country in the year 2030, then its estimated economic 
growth range in the period of 2015-2019 had to be between 8%-10%. However, this target was feasible only if 
its economic growth in the previous period (2010-2014) of 7.5%. Then actual economic growth was dropped up 
to on average 5.8%. Therefore, optimum estimated growth in 2015-2019 will be around 6%. See details at Verico, 
K. (2017). Indonesia towards 2030 and beyond: A Long Run International Trade Foresight. June 7th, MPRA 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79530/   
14 Verico, K. (2017). ‘Membaca Fenomena Makroekonomi 2017’, Tempo Magazine, 16-22 October 2017 
15 The LPEM FEB UI supports the government to increase the awareness of micro & small - medium enterprises 
to be formal by providing license & all kind related information for all businesses, in particular, those which non-
formal ones at the website of http://ukmindonesia.org/index.php  
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value was in 2017 of which for the first time, Indonesia received more than USD 7.6 billion per quarter 
and the highest value was in the last quarter of 2017 of USD 8.6 billion. It was because of first, the Tax 
Amnesty Program (TAP). Second, Indonesia achieved better investment rank from all credit rating 
institutions two times in a row of July and December 2017. Third, in 2016, the government made 
investment liberalization by opening 35 closed sectors to foreign investors. It relaxed regulations for 
global exposure in production network except for the pre-design, architecture and specific services 
for local small and medium enterprises16. FDI inflows need harmonization policy within its host 
countries (Enderwick, 2005) and investment grade status, for the first time in Reform Era, proved that 
structural reform towards the global harmonization policy had been recently working in Indonesia. 
 
Indonesia’s Ease of Doing Business (EODB) rank improved significantly from the rank of 106th in 2015 
to 72nd in 2017. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), Indonesia’s Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) was also improved from 4.53 (scale 7) in 2014 to 4.68 in 2018. Regarding deregulation to 
stimulate economy, in the last two years from September 2015 to September 2017, the government 
has released 16 economic packages17. Investment looks good but why economic growth increased 
slowly?  
 
There are two quick answers. First, there is a need for more comprehensive evaluation using ‘the 
helicopter view’ over all of the investment incentive regulations to avoid overlapping and cancel-out 
one and another. The LPEM’s assessment on logistic & investment related packages in 2017 found 
that there were potential mismatches within related regulations due to the disconnecting between 
objective and the implementation on the ground 18. Second, there were time-lag in the industrial 
outcome as Indonesia remained competitive in the downstream of assembling, marketing & selling 
products (forward) than in the upstream of Research & Development (R&D) & design (backward)19.     
    
2.2. Indonesia’s Infrastructure, ICOR & Investment Multiplier  
The government has made an immediate improvement in reallocating direct subsidy of fuel to more 
productive spending of infrastructures20, constructing the clean government, reforming land 
ownership with a free certificate, providing village budget and enhancing national health system. 
These are parts of his great long-term vision entitled the ‘Nawacita’21.  
 
                                                          
16 Details at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/11/indonesia-opens-35-sectors-foreigners-closes-
20-others.html  
17 Details at https://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/indonesia-to-announce-the-
16th-economic-policy-package-tomorrow/item8151  
18 LPEM FEB UI (2017), Quantitative Assessment on Logistic & Investment Related Packages, Non-Published 
Report 
19 Verico, K. (2016), TPP: Indonesia’s Perspectives, presented in ISEAS Singapore on September 2nd, 2016 
20 In previous time, the proportion of public infrastructure expenditure to the GDP was 7% then due to the Asian 
Financial Crises, it dropped to 3%-4% of the GDP, in fact, it was supposed to be more significant if Indonesia was 
consistent in adopting ‘counter-cyclical’ policy during the crises. Indonesia has started to increase the ratio of 
public infrastructure expenditure per GDP such as that in China with at least 8.5% to GDP. Infrastructure 
development in medium to long run period will decrease logistic cost then economic cost in general. Five biggest 
value: 12 projects of Energy (USD 95.5 billion), one program of electricity (USD 79.6 billion), 74 projects of the 
road (USD 52.6 billion), Train (USD 47.1 billion) and economic zones (USD 22.3 billion).    
21 Nawacita is a Sanskrit of “Nine Goals”. They are: 1) Returning the state to its task of protecting all citizens and 
providing a safe environment; 2) Developing clean, effective, trusted and democratic governance; 3) Developing 
Indonesia’s rural areas; 4) Reforming law enforcement agencies; 5) Improving quality of life; 6) Increasing 
productivity and competitiveness; 7) Promoting economic independence by developing domestic strategic 
sectors; 8) Overhauling the character of the nation; and 9) Strengthening the spirit of “unity in diversity” and 
social reform.  
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The capacity of both national and local government budget to finance infrastructure is around 41% of 
total cost. Therefore, the government needs to be more creative in searching funding alternatives 
such as Public Private Partnership (PPP), State Owned Enterprises contribution, foreign debt, and aid. 
The government had made significant progress in improving scheme of infrastructure by expanding 
eligible sectors with the more flexible legal framework and implementing Land Reform including land 
acquisition. Besides, the government had established Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund to 
secure private sectors who are involving in Indonesia’s infrastructure development, improved One 
Stop Service on investment, provided fiscal payment support for infrastructure development (Ministry 
of Finance Decree no 190/PMK.08/2015) and accelerated strategic projects implementation 
(Presidential Regulation no 3/2016). But again, why the economic growth remains slow?  
 
Indonesia experienced negative trend (increase in magnitude) from ICOR 5.6 (2010-2014)22 to 6.5 
(2014-2016). Previously she owned positive trend from 4.45 (2000-2004) to 4 (2004-2009). If 
Indonesia’s ICOR in the period of 2014-2016 stayed the same, with this GDCF (Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation) level, Indonesia is supposed to book more than five percent of economic growth. The 
increasing ICOR is hypothetically caused by an enormous infrastructure investment in borders and 
remote areas which takes time to generate multiplier impact23. Infrastructure budget allocation for 
this aim is vast. Government budget on infrastructure was significantly increased from Rupiah 139 
trillion (USD 11.7 billion) in 2014 to Rupiah 209 trillion (USD 15.5 billion) in 2017 of which around 
Rupiah 42.14 trillion has been allocated to develop infrastructure outside Java. The ICOR utilises short-
run time frame while vision on current infrastructure is for medium to long-term purposes24. It takes 
some time to obtain more accurate ICOR. 
 
Regarding multiplier impact, in which sector that the investment gives more impact? One indicator 
that can be utilized to see the effect of the investment is multiplier analysis of Input-Output Table25. 
Calculation of top ten percent products in forward & backward linkage are presented in Figure 5 - 
Figure 6 (appendix). The Figure 7 (appendix) shows multiplier of investment in Indonesia.   
 
Backward linkage shows that Indonesia is competitive in the utilization of inputs in food and beverage 
of processing milk, meat, noodles, chocolate and other food. In the primary product of sugar and pulp. 
In beverage of non-alcoholic and in services of electricity, public health & rail transportation. In labour 
intensive of textile and music instruments.  
 
Forward linkage shows that Indonesia is competitive in supporting of outputs in raw materials of oil & 
gas, natural gas & geothermal and crude oil. In chemical of basic except fertilizer, plastic and primary 
commodity of palm oil, rubber and paddy. In services of electricity, building & electricity installation, 
land transportation, telecommunication and leasing services and for labour intensive are paper & 
yarn.  
                                                          
22 This paper uses the 2010-2014 period instead of 2009-2014 considering GFC that impacted investment flowed 
in 2009. 
23 Geographically, Indonesia is the 7th largest country on earth with an enormous gap in infrastructure 
development between Western and Eastern parts of Indonesia as 85% of Indonesia’s population are living in 
Western Indonesia.  
24 Indonesia’s ICOR is higher than average ICOR in Southeast Asia of 3.5. The average normal range is 3-4. 
Indonesia’s ICOR increased from 4.5 (2013) to 6.8 (2016) of which higher than this normal range meaning less 
efficient in allocating investment to boosting economic growth. Definition of ICOR is how much investment is 
needed to increase one monetary unit of GDP. The lower the ICOR, the better and more efficient that country 
or region to utilize its investment to generate GDP growth.  
25 Disclaimer: Indonesia has the latest 2010 Input-Output Table of 185 x 185 sector. The input-output table is 
designed to measure the size of the economic multiplier effects. The multiplier calculation coefficient 
calculations need technological approach. This coefficient matrix obtained by cultivating relationships between 
sectors by dividing the total input.  
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Investment multiplier calculation shows that top ten percent of Indonesia’s investment multiplier is in 
the infrastructure of roads, bridges & ports, railway & its repair services, building & electrical 
installation, residential buildings, agriculture infrastructure, ships & its repair services and other 
buildings. In industrial sector of upstream of iron & steel and downstream of first move engine, 
machinery & electric motors, the machine for office & equipment and other devices. In food materials 
of fruits & livestock and raw materials of oil & gas refinery. The government’s development priority 
on infrastructure is already correct even construction in remote and border areas could not generate 
an immediate impact on the economic growth.  
  
2.3. Real Sector Analysis 
Indonesia’s current account has a long-term relationship with the real exchange rate of Rupiah and 
depends on the surplus of trade balance (Kurniawati & Verico, 2017). This study suggests that to 
maintain its current account stability, Indonesia needs the stability of real exchange rate and the 
surplus in trade balance. Manufacturing products are vital for Indonesia’s trade balance, and they 
affect the patterns of derivative investment (Prabowosunu & Verico, 2017). Both of these studies 
confirmed that Indonesia needs a surplus in manufacturing trade.  
The Figure 8-9 (appendix) using static comparative advantage (Revealed Comparative 
Advantage/RCA)26 and dynamic (Constant Market Share Analysis/CMSA)27 shows that Indonesia’s 
export still relies on primary products of agriculture and oil & gas while in manufacturing, Indonesia 
only competitive in food & beverages product. Indonesia needs to enhance her industrial 
competitiveness of non-food & beverage.   
 
Data of upper-middle level of the industrial survey in Indonesia shows that the highest percentage of 
manufacturers who do export is foreign companies at around of 76% of its total firms while for 
domestic owner and non-status are only 38% and 19% respectively. In order to reduce positive relation 
between FDI28 and import then Indonesia needs to stimulate the rest of 24% of foreign companies to 
do the export. In sum, to increase her export, Indonesia needs to attach to the Global Value Chains 
(GVCs). Besides, the GVCs play an important role in the transfer of technology, sharing knowledge and 
productivity (Hoekman & Javorick, 2006). It also increases the quality of human capital and welfare in 
developing countries as it increases demand for skilled labour (Lall, 2004). This is the problem: 
Indonesia’s workers are the majority the non-skilled one. 
National census data (SUSENAS 2015) shows that most of the Indonesian labour force works in the 
agriculture sector (43%) and service sector (47%) with the highest of 18% work in trade, hotel & 
restaurants. The latter are leisure kind sectors that are recently booming29. Unfortunately, 
manufacture sector only absorbed 7.2% of the workers. The manufacturing sector growth also lower 
than the total economic growth, therefore, its contribution to GDP is always decreasing from 29.1% 
in 2001 to 20.8% in 2016.  
Most of Indonesian’s workers are unskilled workers with the highest degree of junior high school 
(73.6%), and at the same time, 55% of open unemployment is skilled labour with high school and 
vocational degree. Furthermore, most of Indonesia labour force works in the informal sector (64%). 
                                                          
26 For details in Verico, K. (2017). Indonesia towards 2030 and beyond: A Long Run International Trade Foresight. 
June 7th, MPRA https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79530/. This paper uses the combination of RCA and CMSA 
to identify the competitive product. 
The most competitive product is the product with RCA higher than one and CMSA higher than zero.  
28 FDI consists of fresh equity capital, reinvesting of earnings and intercompany debt. 
29 Verico, K (2018), Status Investasi dan Tantangan Ekonomi, Tempo Magazine, 15-21 January 
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Job opportunities in Indonesia are still overriding by non-formal and unskilled labour. It made hard for 
Indonesia to enhance its manufacturing sector competitiveness due to her lack of skilled labour.  
Furthermore, looking at the growth side, Indonesia’s economic growth is still driven by non-tradable 
sectors of the service sector in particular transportation and communication. The transportation 
growth is caused by the changing patterns of consumption from products to leisure time30 while for 
communication due to the growing internet-based communication of information & communication 
technology (ICT) revolution.  
The world has entered the virtual Knowledge-Based Economy era and moving towards automation 
and artificial intelligent age.  It needs optimum utilization of the ICT platform and Indonesia has to 
maximize its creative economy contribution and again, it requires higher quality of human capital. The 
government has to realize that Indonesia needs manufacture export-led growth and ICT based 
economy.  
2.4. Fiscal Gap and Monetary Policy    
Minister of Finance, in 2017, emphasized that revenue side of state budget represents ‘effort’ while 
expenditure reflects ‘commitment’. Government effort aims to achieve stated revenue target while 
the commitment reveals the government preference. This paper discusses the combination of both 
which denotes in the net of revenue and expenditure. The state budget is commonly applied ‘deficit 
position’ to obtain multiplier impact value higher than the government expenditure31. Keeping her 
fiscal sustainability, the deficit per the GDP has to refer to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
measurements. The Annual Budget Deficit (ABD) is maximum of three percent of GDP. The 
accumulated deficit known as Public Debt (PD) must be below 60% per GDP32. Indonesia adopted 
these measurements into the National Law of State Budget 17/2003 in article 12 point 3.  
 
Recent data shows that of -2.46% of ABD of GDP and 27.9% of PD per GDP are below the existing law. 
The ABD ratio represents fiscal balance while PD ratio reflects fiscal sustainability. Indonesia’s ABD 
ratio is better than that of China (-3.8%) and India (-3.5%) and its PD ratio is much less than that of 
Japan (250%) and USA (106%)33. This Indonesia’s fiscal discipline guarantees monetary stability from 
both the inflation and interest rate pressure. This then awarded Indonesia the investment grade status 
in 2017.  
 
From expenditure side, the Minister of Finance of Sri Mulyani boldly cut the state budget in total 
Rupiah 133.8 trillion consisted of Rupiah 65 trillion for central government and Rupiah 68.8 trillion for 
local government transfer. This unpopular cut has successfully avoided Indonesia’s fiscal balance from 
                                                          
30 It is the right time for Indonesia to increase net travel income in trade in services account by intensifying and 
expanding foreign tourist’s country of origin.     
31 Proven as follows:  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡; 𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. (𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖𝑡); 𝒀𝒊𝒕 =
𝟏
(𝟏−𝒃)
. (𝑮𝒊𝒕 − 𝒃. 𝑻𝒊𝒕); 
1
(1−𝑏)
  is a multiplier, b is marginal propensity to consume (MPC). 
32 Originally, this measurement based on Mundell-Fleming of IS-LM model which shows that government budget 
deficit has a negative impact to the inflation rate and later on to interest rate. It potentially gives negative impact 
to the investment. This concept has been known as ‘crowding-out effect’. Another concept is ‘fiscal 
sustainability’ that limiting the accumulated deficit to keep government budget stable. This measurement is also 
proportioned into the GDP known Public Debt to GDP. As illustrated follows 
𝑩𝒕
𝑌𝑡
= (1 + 𝑟).
𝑌𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡
.
𝐵𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
.
(𝐺𝑡−𝑇𝑡)
𝑌𝑡
; Bt = 
current debt; r=interest rate of debt; Yt=current GDP; Gt= current government expenditure. 
33 Indonesia’s fiscal balance & sustainability are basically safe, but in July-August 2017, they were become ‘hot 
political issues’ of which referring to Tempo Magazine (7-13 August 2017) these were driven by the members of 
opposition parties.   
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the mounting deficit34. From revenue side, ratio between realization of tax collection and its initial 
target in 2017 achieved only 89.4% and claimed as the highest rate in the last five years which better 
than that of 2016 of 83.4%35. The government decision to reduce revenue target in 2017 is indeed the 
right choice. 
      
How about tax ratio per GDP? Indonesia has around 180 million potential taxpayers but only 28 million 
who are registered with just 10 million who comply to pay tax regularly. If formal activities are those 
who own business with fixed-term worker and formal worker itself then Indonesia’s tax base only 
around 36% of formal workers36. The proportion of Indonesia’s tax revenue per GDP is less than 
12.75% and remains the lowest in Southeast Asia. Thailand records 17% of tax ratio, Malaysia is 15.5%, 
the Philippines is 14.4%, Singapore is 14.2%, and Vietnam is 13.8%. Advanced countries such as France 
has 44.6%, Germany has 40.65%, the UK is 39%, and the US is 26.9%37.  
 
Indonesia’s tax ratio still below the IMF’s minimum safe rate of 12.75%. Indonesia aims to achieve tax 
ratio of 15% of GDP by 2020 and has started to implement more strategic and comprehensive tax 
system reform on tax base & compliance38. This is for long-run, in medium-run, Indonesia has to 
increase up to 44 million of new taxpayers and it needs more tax officers for at least doubled from 37 
thousand to 74 thousand.  How about for the short-run? The answer is tax amnesty. It created USD 
324 billion declarations, USD 96 billion government revenue and more than 3 million new Indonesian 
taxpayers. This was claimed as the biggest tax amnesty program in history39. Again, tax amnesty is not 
enough as it is only for short-run and once in a lifetime.  
   
Near future challenge for Indonesia tax ratio is digital economy40. It has increased number of non-
formal workers due to the disincentive to start the real-life business and more incentive to run virtual 
business utilizing social media. The latter supports ‘peer to peer’ transaction which beyond 
government ability to detect and collect the taxes. It can be inferred that if the government failed to 
anticipate this near future dynamic progress of e-commerce and financial technology, then Indonesia 
will be experiencing a declining tax revenue collection. Government needs to enlarge tax base and 
potential tax revenue form this digital era41.  
 
2.5. Government Expenditure Multiplier 
Indonesia’s table IO analysis shows that the top ten percent of government multiplier is on the sector 
that related to public services of education, health, general and other public services. The Figure 10 
(appendix) shows the gap between public service multiplier and non-public sector multiplier is rather 
                                                          
34 Indonesia received some appreciations for her fiscal discipline achievement, and given other macroeconomic 
improvements afterward, H.E. Sri Mulyani granted an award as the Best Minister of Finance in the World at the 
World Summit in Dubai on February 11th 2018.  
35 Details at https://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/tax-revenue-target-indonesia-
2017-government-eyes-16.8-growth/item7534  
36 Verico, K (2018), ‘Status Investasi dan Tantangan Ekonomi’, Tempo Magazine, 15-21 January 
37 Details at https://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/tax-in-indonesia-indonesian-tax-
to-gdp-ratio-and-tax-compliance-still-low/item2293  
38 The government has been working on the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) with supported by the 
OECD that will be launched in September 2018. This system helps Indonesia to verify compliance rate of 
taxpayers including multinational cooperation. This is an example of more comprehensive and strategic policy 
than Tax Amnesty.   
39 For details at https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/indonesias-flawed-tax-amnesty/  
40 Currently internet user in Indonesia around 52% of the population whose 13% experienced bought the online 
ticket and 12% did online groceries transaction (based on the survey of Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet 
Indonesia). As for investment outlook, according to Google & A.T. Kearney investor survey, 2017 was for e-
commerce & travel while 2018 is for financial technology.    
41 Verico, K (2018), ‘Status Investasi dan Tantangan Ekonomi’, Tempo Magazine, 15-21 January 
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high. Government service aimed for basic public services then Indonesia’s Human Development 
Index42 increases from 0.686 (2014) to 0.689 (2015), but the rank dropped from 110th (2014) to 113th 
(2015)43. Given this, the government main focus on human capital development is correct.  
 
Other sectors that obtained high multiplier impact from government expenditure are health services 
of pharmaceutical products and education materials of paper products. Government expenditure also 
generates significant multiplier on trade other than car & motorcycle, land transportation, banking, 
and electricity. The latter needs to be more modernized, and the government showed serious 
commitment on the development of new power plant44.  
 
Besides, the government’s grand vision on maritime is matching with Indonesia’s geographical 
condition as archipelago country. In his first three years, under the Ministry of Maritime Affairs & 
Fisheries, government burned any fishing vessels that violate Indonesia’s economic exclusive zone. 
This policy aims to protect the supply of fishes, but its method has received pros and cons globally. In 
2018 under the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs, Indonesia is starting to change the action 
form burning the vessels to utilize them locally45.   
 
2.6. Monetary Overview 
Data shows, recently, the inflation rate has continuously decreased therefore Bank of Indonesia could 
decrease BI’s interest rate. In October 2014, BI rate was 7.75% then reduction in February 2015 to 
7.5%. Afterwards around six times, BI has decreased its rate in 2016 from 7.5% to 7.25% in January to 
7% in February, 6.75% in March, 6.5% in June, 5.25% in August, 5% in September, 4.75% in October. 
In August 2016 BI changed its BI rate to BI-7 Day Repo Rate46. The latest 4.75% of BI-7 Day Repo Rate 
remained slightly longer for almost 9 months before BI reduced it to 4.5% in August and 4.25% in 
September 2017. The Figure 11 shows that BI interest rate follows inflation rate. If inflation rate 
decline then BI interest rate also declines. Decreasing trend of BI-7 Day Repo Rate is supposed to 
increase economic growth. However, the economic growth is only slightly increased from 4.88% in 
2015 to 5.02% in 2016 and 5.1% in 2017. This pattern is similar to Indonesia’s Non-Performing Loans 
(NPL) per total gross loans which slightly increase from 2.1% (2014) to 2.4% (2015) and 2.9% (2016). 
The percentage of NPL increases because of two factors. First, low performance of the investment in 
the wholesale, shophouse & manufacturing sector due to the increase of online transaction and 
demand shift from goods to leisure consumption. Second, the uncertain global economy that 
influences commercial banks increases their Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) instead of allocates the 
investment.  
 
Law, no 3/2004 in article 7 point 1, mentioned that the objective of BI is to assure Rupiah stability and 
article 10-point 1 letter A mentioned that monetary policy (i.e. interest rate) has to follow inflation 
rate targeting. Furthermore, empirically, the inflation rate is not necessarily the economic growth 
booster but the economic growth itself. This fact can be seen in the experiences of the emerging 
countries of China, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand & Indonesia before the AFC.  
  
                                                          
42 Details at https://countryeconomy.com/hdi/indonesia  
43 Indonesia faces high incidence of communicable diseases and high infant mortality rate 
44 The government had proposed 35 gigawatts of power in 2019 as the followed up of 10 gigawatts policy of in 
2005.  
45 This new policy will generate another controversial issue as it seems Indonesia is interested in taking over 
the foreign vessels for its local fisheries.  
46 This 7-day repo rate is more practical & useful than BI rate as BI has to implement this rate directly in the 
financial market, for instance, BI uses this rate when selling government bonds (monetary contraction for 
increasing interest rate) or buying government bonds (monetary expansionary for decreasing interest rate).   
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2.7. Uncovered Interest Parity 
The Table 1 (appendix) shows that the highest undervalue Rupiah towards USD was in 2014 and 2015 
of 87% and 88% respectively. This affected monetary policy of interest rate (BI rate) which was 
increased at 25 basis point from 7.5% (September 2014) to 7.75% (October 2014). Bank of Indonesia 
lowered it back to 7.5% in February 2015 and kept it until December 2015. The undervalue Rupiah 
which dropped from Rupiah per USD 11,865 (2014) to Rupiah per USD 13,389 (2015) turned to be 
slightly stronger at Rupiah per USD 13,308 (2016) and stable until February 2018. This improvement 
does not correlate with the eight reform packages that released by the government from September 
9th to December 21st,2015 as at that time they were not yet ‘ineffective’. Rupiah per USD was getting 
stronger at the end of 2015 simply because of the ‘unchanged unemployment rate’ of the USA at five 
percent. Capital outflowing which was preliminary expected to leave from emerging countries 
including Indonesia to the USA did not happen. It kept inflation rate to be low and stable.  
 
Domestic real sector stability and global finance resilient of Indonesia have supported Indonesia’s 
monetary sector stability. It shows that IS-LM equilibrium which represented by fiscal and monetary 
policy collaboration has been impeccably managed by both Government of Indonesia and Bank of 
Indonesia. On the other hand, since early of March 2018, Rupiah is under pressure as US 
macroeconomy of economic growth and inflation rate are increasing making the Fed plan to increase 
its rate. It has been stimulating capital flow back from the emerging countries to the US. Asia’s 
derivative market including Indonesia’s Rupiah per USD has been recently weakening.  
 
2.8. Institutions Coordination 
By regulation, for fiscal (IS) and monetary (LM) coordination has been regulated by Law No 3/2004 on 
Bank Indonesia (BI). The article 52-point 1 mentioned that Bank of Indonesia is government treasurer 
and point 2 said that it provides interest payment for government saving. Article 55 point 1 stated that 
before releasing government bonds, Ministry of Finance has to consult with Bank of Indonesia. It was 
designed to avoid the crowding-out effect of deficit fiscal to the interest rate hikes as well as to 
harmonize fiscal & monetary policy47. If by law, the government is not able to expand its deficit due 
to the limit of three percent of GDP then BI surely will provide monetary expansion.    
 
As for banking and non-banking services supervision, the Law No 3/2004 article 34 point 1 stated that 
BI’s primary task is to focus on monetary authority while for the bank and non-bank supervision is 
conducted by the Financial Service Authority (OJK). This article urged that OJK has to be established 
by December 31st, 2010 or 6 years after Law 3/2004 released. OJK was established in 2011 by Law No 
21/2011 which officially took Minister of Finance’s authority on supervising non-bank financial 
services of insurance, pension fund, non-bank financing institution and Capital Market Supervisory 
Agency & Financial Institution (BAPEPAM-LK) authority on monitoring stock market trading on 
December 31st,2012. A year later on December 31st,2013 OJK took over Bank of Indonesia’s authority 
on supervising banks and finally microfinance institution in 2015.  The establishment of OJK is 
dedicated to separate monetary authority (BI) & fiscal policymakers (MoF) to the supervision of the 
bank & non-bank.   
 
Indonesia is still facing low ratio of banked population. Financial inclusion can help Indonesia to reduce 
its unbanked population ratio, increasing economic growth, income per capita and reducing 
inequality. As for supporting this financial inclusion, Indonesia’s Central Bank (Bank Indonesia/BI) 
established Layanan Keuangan Dijital (LKD) for digital financial services & e-money in 2013 and 
Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/OJK) established branchless banking named Laku 
Pandai (LP) in 2015. The latter is also utilized by the government to accurately transfer direct non-cash 
                                                          
47 Theory shows that the annual budget deficit (ABD or fiscal side) significantly affects ‘triangle relation’ of 
inflation, exchange and interest rate (monetary side).  Any distortion in ABD will impact investment grade, 
therefore, jeopardizes both the saving - investment gap and external balance deficit.   
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payment of Welfare Family Saving Program to the targeted beneficiaries. Study of the LPEM in 2017 
found that main financial inclusion objective to reduce unbanked population ratio was still not optimal 
as the primary user of financial technology were those who had already have the bank account48.         
 
Nowadays the most challenge for monetary and financial service authority collaboration including in 
Indonesia is virtual peer to peer financial transaction using virtual platform (blockchain) with non-
central bank’s medium of exchange (cryptocurrency) based on specific form (bitcoin). This virtual 
transaction can trap international exchange rate at risk as none of the monetary authority could 
supervise it. Bank of Indonesia in its press release on January 13th,2018 has banned cryptocurrency 
exchange in Indonesia as it can damage monetary system stability. However, it is too early to conclude 
the effectiveness of this regulation as bitcoin has been globally used under ‘peer to peer’ model.  
 
3. Conclusion  
The recent government smoothly made progress for Indonesia’s macroeconomy started in late of 
2016. Many related indicators showed positive in trend even though it starts under some 
macroeconomic disadvantages both from global domestic factors. The decreasing of current account 
deficit proves that his administration has been able to improve productivity and international oriented 
market.  
 
The government focuses on the campaign promises on increasing human capital quality, productivity 
& competitiveness in the global market, enhancing economic independence through local-driven-
strategic sectors. The latter needs infrastructure development in all around Indonesia, not only in Java 
and Sumatera islands. Indonesia’s increasing ICOR even with high FDI inflows and massive 
infrastructure funding outside main islands of Java and Sumatera indicated that the government is 
consistent with its long-term vision even this generates a lower impact on economic growth than that 
of being practical with the short-term vision. Furthermore, The NPL in wholesale, shophouse & 
manufacture slightly increases due to the increase in online transaction and demand shifting from 
goods to leisure-related services. In the banking sector, due to global economic uncertainty, capital 
adequacy ratio increases more than real investment allocation.  
 
In this era, Indonesia recorded low inflation and interest rate. Given state budget is the deficit, this 
proved that ‘crowding-out’ effect did not happen. In February 2017, Indonesia has created 4 million 
workers yearly (IEQ World Bank, 2017). It revealed that ‘Phillips Curve’ which argued that employment 
creation needs high inflation rate (trade-off) also did not occur. The inflation rate was rather low, but 
unemployment declines from 6.18% in the last quarter of 2015 to 5.5% in the last quarter 2017. 
Economic growth that always higher than the inflation rate indicates that Indonesia’s macroeconomy 
is going towards the ‘golden rule’ condition. In sum, since 2016, Indonesia recorded significant 
macroeconomic performance. Ministry of Finance’s fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability which 
awarded investment grade status that combined with persistent BI’s financial inclusion, inflation 
targeting, financial technology empowerment and OJK’s reliable supervision and its consumer 
protection have further enhanced Indonesia’s macroeconomic performance. The coordination 
between government (MoF), monetary authority (BI) and financial supervisor (OJK) was robust that 
made Indonesia’s monetary sector stable.   
 
  
                                                          
48 Nuryakin, C., et all (2017), Financial Inclusion through Digital Financial Services and Branchless Banking: 
Inclusiveness, Challenges & Opportunities, LPEM Working Paper 008, June.  
Link:http://www.lpem.org/financial-inclusion-digital-financial-services-branchless-banking-inclusiveness-
challenges-opportunities/   
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Appendix 
Table 1.  
REER, Nominal Exchange Rate (Rupiah/USD), Real Exchange Rate (Rupiah/USD) and Nominal – 
Real Exchange Rate of Indonesia 2010 – 2017 
Year 
  LCU per USD Nominal 
Undervalue 
Rupiah per USD 
REER  Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate* 
2010 100.00 9,090  9,090  0**  
2011 99.98 8,770  8,768  2  
2012 96.25 9,387  9,035  352  
2013 93.04 10,461  9,733  728  
2014 87.05 11,865  10,329  1,536  
2015 88.87 13,389  11,899  1,491  
2016 92.51 13,308  12,312  997  
2017 94.21 13,380  12,605  775  
Source: *Calculated RER is based on data of https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RBIDBIS for REER and WDI of the 
World Bank for Nominal Exchange Rate, 2018 
**Zero as constant price of 2010 
 
Figure 1.  
Indonesia’s Current Account Balance 2010 – 2017 
 
Source: Based on data of http://www.bi.go.id/sdds/, 2018 
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Figure 2.  
Indonesia’s Economic Growth, Inflation Rate and GNI Per Capita 
1970 – 2017 
 
Source: Based on data of WDI of the World Bank, 2018 
 
Figure 3.  
Indonesia’s Consumption Proportion by Sub-Sector 
2017 
 
Source: Calculated based on data of CEIC, 2017 
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Figure 4.  
Indonesia’s Consumption Growth by Sub-Sector 
2017 
 
Source: Calculated based on data of CEIC, 2017 
 
Figure 5.  
Indonesia’s Backward Linkage  
Input Output Table  
 
Source: Calculated based on IO Table 2010 of BPS Indonesia 
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Figure 6.  
Indonesia’s Forward Linkage  
Input Output Table  
 
Source: Calculated based on IO Table 2010 of BPS Indonesia 
 
Figure 7.  
Indonesia’s Investment Multiplier  
Input Output Table  
 
Source: Calculated based on IO Table 2010 of BPS Indonesia 
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Figure 8.  
Indonesia’s Comparative (RCA) and Competitive (CMSA) 2000-2005 
 
Source: Calculated based on HS-1 Data of the WTO 
 
Figure 9.  
Indonesia’s Comparative (RCA) and Competitive (CMSA) 2005-2015 
 
Source: Calculated based on HS-1 Data of the WTO 
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Figure 10.  
Indonesia’s Government Expenditure Multiplier  
Input Output Table  
 
Source: Calculated based on IO Table 2010 of BPS Indonesia 
 
Figure 11.  
Monthly Inflation Rate and BI Rate  
2015-2017 
 
Source: Based on data of http://www.bi.go.id/sdds/, 2018 
Note: Since August 2016, BI Rate has been changed into BI 7 Day-Repo Rate, calculation of inflation is 
m.o.m (month on month) 
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